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Introduction
Research Questions
1 Liberalisation of water supplies in a situation of rapid urban expansion has made for
great  changes  in  water  provisioning  patterns  in  many  African  cities.  While  publicly
controlled  utilities with  piped  systems  for  distribution  continue  to  serve  the  formal
economy and the well-to-do citizens,  they have increasingly been supplemented with
various other modes of provision for and by the poor. Highly fragmented and largely
informalised structures are playing an increasing role, not only in practice but also as a
recognized and expanding form for satisfying basic needs of  the urban masses.  Such
fragmented supply  structures  have made for  highly  dispersed forms of  provisioning.
Located  at  scale  levels  below  the  municipal  and  even  beyond  the  reach  of  local
governments,  these  dispersed  small-scale  providers  commonly  show  new  forms  of
regulation and new relations between providers, users and concerned citizens. In this
situation, agents concerned with the process of democratisation and the introduction of a
human rights perspective to the provision of basic services have put popular access and
influence over matters of access high on the agenda. As a result, the issue of the nature of
community level governance has come to the fore, in particular as it relates to the scope
for democratic modes of popular influence in locations where state authority is weak. 
2 These matters are discussed in this  article using a case study of  the peripheral  low-
income community of Tudun Murtala in the large old city of Kano on the savannah of
northern Nigeria in West Africa as the point of departure. My assumption is that for state
backed  democratic  regulation  of  water  provision  for  the  poor  to  be  realized,  the
regulatory powers of the state will  need to reach beyond the local government level,
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which is where decentralisation policies are currently targeted. To effectively regulate
the actual conditions of supply, these powers need to reach even further down, to the
level  of  the  community,  where  their  current  weakness  leaves  uncontested  scope  for
alternative forces which do not necessarily cater for the interests of  the low-income
population. In the community studied here, legacies of colonial indirect rule remain in
the form of neo-traditional modes of regulation of popular access to livelihood resources,
and in a weak tradition of collective action, even on issues of provision of basic services.
We  may  consider  parliamentary  democracy  as  the  main  guarantor of  democratic
representation in the realization of popular rights of access to water, or leave the door
open for alternative ‘substantial’ modes of popular influence on access. Probing the place
specific  forms of  governance at  the community level,  and in particular  the forms of
articulation  between  state  based  institutions  and  other  forms  for  deliberation,  will
contribute necessary understanding of use in realizing democratic access to water in an
era when provision of this service is increasingly fragmented and dispersed. 
 
Research Context and Data : ‘People, Provisioning and Place in
African Cities’ 
3 The Nigerian case study reported here was carried out in the context of a series of studies
of contemporary changes in urban service and livelihood in Africa at the Department of
Human  Geography  at  Stockholm  University  during  1998-2007.  The  focus  of  this
programme,  People,  Provisioning  and  Place  in  African  Cities1,  was  the  implications  of
liberalisation and globalisation for agency of provision and regulation of basic means of
livelihood in the cities. In some of the studies the changes in modes of popular influence
on  distribution  and  access  to  resources,  under  variable  local  conditions,  have  been
explored. The programme contained studies of different African cities and on different
sectors of  livelihood and service provision,  with similar analytical  departures,  among
these are Adama (2007), Appelblad, (2008), Cadstedt (2006), Kjellén (2006). My own case
study concerns patterns of water provisioning2 in one expanding peripheral low-income
area in Kano. A fuller empirical account of the agents and relations of water provisioning
there has been published as Andrae (2005) where fuller references to its source materials
are also given. The sources include qualitative interviews with key informants in Tudun
Murtala ; at Kano State Water Board ; Kano State Environment Planning and Protection
Agency, KASEPPA; and Community Action for Popular Participation, CAPP, in 2000 and
2002. They also include two consultancy reports made for Kano Water Board that were
the basis for external donors to fund reforms at the dysfunctional central public utility.3 I
further rely on my networks from earlier studies on Kano over the past decades (Andrae
&  Beckman  1985,  1998).  Preliminaries  to  the  present  article  were  presented  at
conferences on Decentralisation in Practice in Uppsala 20044 and on Human Rights Movements
in Nigeria held in Kano in 2007 (Andrae 2007). The present article is a more analytical
development  of  these  empirical  presentations,  where  the  main  contribution  is  to
problematise the implications for democratic popular influence of the de-scaling of water
provision in a situation where secular organisation at the community level is weak and
largely pre-empted by the strength of neo-traditional powers. Renewed contacts with
informants in Tudun Murtala in 2007 confirmed that, apart from a colossal expansion of
local private boreholes, the same basic provisioning model remained in place.
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Analytical Framework and Relation to Current Discourses
4 Historically in African urban water provision, public utilities managed at the municipal
level  have a  central  role  (Nilsson 2006).  With the break-up of  state  monopolies  into
several components with different ownership, we can clearly see that there is a spatial
dimension to change. Degree of dispersal and patterns of location relate to the altered
structures  of  supply  and  regulation.  The  changes  in  supply  structures,  in  forms  for
regulation,  and  in  location  patterns,  are  also  reflected  in  changes  in  provisioning
relations  to  users  and  citizens.  These  in  turn  will  entail  different  conditions  for
democratic  popular  influence.  The  role  of,  and  scope  for,  parliamentary  forms  for
democratic regulation versus ‘substantial’  democracy modes depend on historic place
specific factors that may fruitfully be sought through comparative case oriented research.
While there may be general logics of location and of governance associated with the scale
of administration and management, we can also expect to find particular scale and place
specific logics, where socio-cultural and political factors operating at different levels in
the spatial systems influence the outcome. Some elaboration is in order. 
5 The dominating form for liberalisation of urban water supplies in Africa, that has been
commonly  adopted  in  national  government  policies  and  eagerly  championed  by  the
World  Bank,  has  been  the  take-over  by  transnational  companies  of  ownership  or
management  in  previously  publicly  owned  water  utilities.  While  this  was  a  rather
aggressive development running through the 1990s (Hall, Bayliss & Lobina 2002 ; UNDP
2006), it seems that we may already be entering a post-privatisation era at this level of
large-scale supplies. With increasing popular resistance (Hall et al. 2005), and as the costs
of operating the run-down public pipe-born systems are rapidly becoming evident to the
transnational companies, the thrust for privatisation on this model is increasingly giving
way to re-nationalisation. One example of this is Tanzania (Kjellén 2006). We are also
beginning to see various other forms for commercialisation, still under public control, as
in the case of Uganda (Appelblad 2008). All along we have, however, seen another parallel
and still ongoing process of establishment of small and fragmented non-public suppliers.
It occurs in replacement of the breaking-down public systems of water supply (which
often date back to early colonial times), and has come to constitute a major mode of
provision for the needs of the masses of the urban poor in many African cities. It is a
development that connects with what was for a long-time the only available form for
developing supplies in the rapidly expanding peripheral and often unplanned areas of
cities. Covered by Kjellén and McGranahan (2006) this small-scale and mainly informally
organised privatisation of provision for the urban poor, already described by Solo (1999),
has  attracted  continued  attention  in  conjunction  with  recent  movements  at  the
international level to enforce the access to water as a human right (UN Economic and
Social Council, 2003). It includes renewed concerns, mainly on the part of international
agencies and donors and more rarely of national government authorities, for the need to
extend public responsibilities for service provision beyond the wealthy elites to these
majorities, if not by supply then at least by regulation of the relations of provision. The
2006 UNDP World Development Report dealing with water thus puts strong emphasis on
the problem of governance (UNDP 2006).
6 The modes of poor people’s provisioning and the politics involved in these are attracting
increased attention within the research community. Remembering that even rights-based
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regimes do not preclude the need for the urban poor to actively contesttheir rights of
access, there are strong pressures on researchers to contribute better understandings of
the modes of insertion of the poor in existing and developing provisioning regimes, and
to provide knowledge that is of use for their struggles for better access. Seen as a matter
of empowerment, the political dimension must not be allowed to be concealed in top-
down modes of provision under the concept of participatory management.
7 The large-scale utility systems typical of the pipe-born supplies inherited from colonial
times  are  commonly run from the  metropolitan level,  obeying the  logics  of  ‘natural
monopolies’ with potentials for large economies of scale to be gained by concentration of
processing,  distribution  and  administration  (Belli  1997 ;  Kjellén  2006 ;  Nilsson  2006 :
Article 3).  In the peripheral areas where the metropolitan grid no longer reaches,  or
where it is no longer functional due to lack of maintenance, the smaller-scale providers
take over as suppliers in highly fragmented structures of establishments located at the
level of the neighbourhood community. With current rapid expansion in the peripheries
of the cities, this type of supplier already dominates in supplying the poor populations
8 Our concern here is that in much of Africa, the state authorities have not only let go of
their supply functions, legitimized by reigning neo-liberal ideologies as promoted notably
by the World Bank. They have also lost their regulating functions concerning service
supplies that  are targeting the urban poor,  as  they have been allowed to develop in
distant peripheries by a largely unregistered mass of providers. We can then expect to
find that regulation of relations around these peripheral supply points will  be in the
hands of forces other than the local government, as these will take place in communities
where  the  powers  of  the  ‘secular’  state  hardly  reach.  The  result  will  be  a  kind  of
decentralisation of regulation ‘by default’, driven by the de-scaling of supplies through
expansion of small-scale and informal forms of provision. 
9 Strategies  of  decentralisation of  service  provision as  a  policy  option  have  become a
common component of liberalisation policies and rhetoric, and have usually been based
on ideas of the democratic potentials that can be realised by moving control over basic
livelihood services closer to the people. Such ideas have been championed by the global
donor community in furtherance of impacts on efficiency, resource mobilisation, local
relevance and popular participation (see Cheema 2005 ; Chikulo 1998 ; and for Nigeria,
Crook & Manor 1993 ; Gboyega 1998). The need for renewed awareness of the significance
of  the spatial  level  below that  of  the local  government,  the community level,  in the
decentralisation problematic concerning regulation of service provision is underlined by
the community case I have chosen to study (Andrae 2005). Clearly the currently popular
notions  of  ‘Spaces  for  Democracy’  (Barnett  &  Low  2006)  and  ‘Spaces  for  Change’
(Cornwall and Coelho 2007) need to be applied in the literalsense of where the power game
around access to services by the poor is actually played out, since this has implications
for who regulates access, influence and empowerment to whose benefit. In this context it
is  pertinent to maintain that concern with community level  governance will  need to
move to a more central place in this analysis.
10 The character of alternative community level regulation structures is of course variable,
and the conditions of variation are matters that we need to further explore empirically.
The  definition  of  place  specificities  and  variations  of  local  patterns  in  the  different
institutional,  socio-political  and  physical  contexts  are  pressing  challenges  for
geographical  research,  not  least  if  the  arguments  are  to  be  effective  against  the
generalised  policies  and  loan  conditionality  pushed  by  the  powerful  global  finance
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institutions.  Contributions  of  case  studies  may produce  a  basis  for  defining  relevant
parameters for comparative studies. This is thus one purpose of the analysis of the case
presented here. 
11 We apply a concept of governance that, in this context, looks as follows.5 With the rapid
fragmentation  of  water  supplies,  we  observe  a  growing  number  of  forms  of  water
provision with different conditions of access. Whether mediated by the market, or by
public or communal supply, access will be influenced by the regulation by powers that
may rest with the state,  private owners collective organisations of  users,  or of  other
citizens who support their cause. These rule-setting agents are, however, only one side of
the governing relation. Successful regulation rests on relations to the users,  or other
citizens, with political interest in the supply, and depends on their legitimisation of the
arrangement of supply. The resulting structure of provisioning relations is what we term
a mode of governance. Operationally we may delimit these relationships by looking for the
users of the various supplies, and particularly their agency of demand-making, on the one
hand,  and then,  on the other hand,  define the authorities  that  enter into regulating
relations,  for groups of  suppliers,  with the demand making users (and their political
allies) 6. This is the approach applied in the case treated here.
12 There is a spatial dimension to the mode of governance. The holders of rule-setting power
may  relate  to  the  concerned  population  from  and  over  different  scale  levels.  Since
administrative state structures are important in regulation of services, the notions of
space and scale may in this case follow these state administrative structures. From the
point  of  view of  one particular  spatial  level  we may talk  of  ‘multi-level  governance’
(Elander 2002). We may finally expect a variation in governance according to specific
conditions in particular places. 
13 The regulating structures that we expect in the African context are, first of all, the public
authorities, which come in very different shapes. Mamdani (1996) has drawn attention to
the existence of the bi-furcated state, where the colonial powers have left legacies of their
neo-traditional systems of indirect rule, which in some places still remain. Lund (2006)
has developed the notion of the ‘twilight state’ indicating the range of forms of public
authority structures that may perform state-like functions. And Buur and Kyed (2006) in
the above publication by Lund, have given us interesting examples of alternative agents
performing such functions in the context of weak or destroyed state authority (e.g. in
post-war  Mocambique).  The  blurred  nature  of  state  authority  will  be  particularly
pertinent at the local level, where the presence of the modern states has usually been
particularly weak. Policies of decentralisation of state functions have usually been aimed
at  addressing  this  structural  phenomenon,  while  usually  considering  the  local
government level low enough for reaching the whole population. 
14 A specific condition in the case of Northern Nigeria in general, and Kano in particular, is
then the strength of its heritage of neo-traditional rule, once the very model for British
colonial indirect rule, and the viability of its remnants. The implications of this for the
mode of governance and the potentials for popular influence over water provisioning
gives  the  chosen  case  its  very  specific  character,  well  suited  for  demonstrating  the
significance of local conditions for the relations of service provision. 
15 When it comes to popular influence over access and conditions of access, it is clear that
the clientilistic relations between neo-traditional authorities and community residents
are not favourable for collective organising. In other situations where the conditions for
civic organising have been strong,  as in South Africa,  they have been shown to hold
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potentials for channelling real influence, as demonstrated by Stokke and Oldfield (2002).
The experience is that where these are restricted or historically weak, the ‘space’ for
alternative modes of ‘substantial’  democratic influences is considerably narrowed (see
Gaventa 2004 and also Harriss  et  al.  2004,  where the contribution by Törnquist  is  of
particular relevance). This puts great weight on the functioning of parliamentary modes
of representation of popular interests, and on the structure of the state institutions for
fair regulation of the provision of a basic needs service, such as water. Alternatively the
recent search for functioning modes of ‘deliberative democracy’ à la Habermas and ‘new
forms of citizenship’ must continue (as discussed by Gaventa 2007, who rather uses the
term ‘substantive democracy’).
16 Departing from the observation of the recently de-scaled location of water supply to the
low-income community of  Tudun Murtala,  we have thus set  out to probe the spatial
structure of the relations of regulation over water as seen from the perspective of this
community.  We  note  that  these  relations  result  in  a  spatially  skewed  governance
structure, where the regulation of supplies has to a very high degree come to be played
out at the community level. The question in focus, then, concerns the implications that
this structure of relations will have for the democratic influence that users and citizens
may exert on their access to household water. 
 
The Case of Tudun Murtala, Kano
Research Area 
17 The  area  of  our  case  study,  Tudun  Murtala,  was  a  rapidly  expanding  low-income
community of some 20,000 inhabitants at the time of this study, in 2000 and 2002. It is
situated  on  the  north-eastern  outskirts  of  the  city  of  Kano.  With  over  two  million
inhabitants, this is the second city of Nigeria, located in the far north of the country. It is
an industrial and administrative centre with long historical standing as a Muslim cultural
and religious node in the Nigerian North and the surrounding Sudan region. It is a city
within Kano State, which is one of 36 states (or provinces) in the Nigerian Federation.
These  are  divided into  local  government  areas,  each with  its  own local  government
council. Tudun Murtala is part of Nassarawa local government area. The parallel neo-
traditional authority structure contains the Emir of Kano to which a number of district-
heads, appointed by him, report. The districts are divided into wards with ward heads
who are popularly elected for life. At the time of my study Tudun Murtala had recently
been expanded from one ward with one head to four wards, each with their own ward
head.  Of  these,  one  was  particularly  vocal  and  enterprising  and  was  one  of  my
respondents. His information on the role of ward heads as agents in the provisioning
game at this level is amply used in this case.7
18 The origin of the community is as a resettlement area of people who were earlier living in
the adjacent Bompai area, which was designated an industrial area half a century ago.
The  core  of  the  population  today  is  of  Muslim  Hausa  origin,  from  Kano  and  its
surrounding rural regions, with smaller numbers of southern immigrants that belong to a
Christian religion. 
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De-scaled Supply and Decentralised Regulation 
19 In Kano the colonial piped water utility, built in the 1930s, has been allowed by the city
level  public  authorities  to  deteriorate,  particularly  in  low-income  residential  areas
outside  the  walled  historic  inner  City  and  the  central  high-income  Government
Residential Areas (GRAs). In the old outer areas most of the piped public supply has, as it
has gradually broken down, been replaced by a host of non-public sources of supply.
Similar sources of supply are also emerging in the rapidly growing new expansion areas
of  these  same communities.  It  is  this  process  of  privatisation  by  fragmentation  and
informalisation from the previously centralised city level public supply that can be shown
to have resulted in a de-scaling in agency of supply down to the community level. The
result is summarised in Table 1, which thus shows the situation in the community of
Tudun Murtala in the first years of this century. 
 
Table 1 : Agents involved in supply by scale level and mode of regulation 
Mode of regulation Scale level of supply     
  Community Local Govt. City
State Water tap Self-help Funding Pipe grid
State through formal market Tap operator
Bore hole
Competing industry  
Informal market Vendors     
Neo-traditional Mosque
Communal
Well
  Philanthropy
Household/Self House wells
Self-help labour
    
20 Reading down the columns we see the various agents involved in supplying water that are
found at different spatial levels from community through local government  to city level.
In  the  rows  in  the  table  these  sources  are  categorized  according  to  principles  of
regulation which have replaced the increasingly deficient state regulated supplies. I have
termed these principles modes of regulation and they are shown to range from state to
formal (state regulated) and informal market, neo-traditional and finally household/self
regulation. We will look at the supply structures and regulation structures in turn.8
21 The public piped water source,  which previously supplied the central  sections of  the
community of Tudun Murtala from a handful of community stand-pipes, had by the year
2002 been reduced to a single commercially operated water tap at the entrance to the
area.  Operators  of  commercial  deep  bore-holes,  and  independently  working  water
vendors distributing the water from these outlets and from the only functioning local tap
on the metropolitan grid, are now major providers, who have stepped in to supplement
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the common shallow hand-dug house wells and a few wells provided by the mosque and
by the community. Together they form the core of a supply system that has thus moved
from a highly centralised publicly controlled one to a highly decentralised one involving
a multitude of non-state providers. 
22 The community-based supplies are supplemented by those initiated at the city and local
government  levels.  These  involve  the  services  of  self-help  groups  and  the
‘philanthropists’ of religious and political motivation. Self-help groups are a form for co-
operation between community groups and the local government in the field of physical
water  regulation  with  focus  on  prevention  of  further  erosion  along  the  drainage
channels. It is in this case manifested in public sponsorship and financial support for a
community based group with a chairman who is locally elected through the mediation of
and dependence on patronage from the neo-traditional ward heads. The motive behind
this public support for water management lies primarily in the prevention of pollution of
household wells. It is one of the few contact points between local government and the
community regarding water supplies.  
23 Supply by philanthropists along neo-traditional lines, e.g. by donation of water by tanks,
has  been  a  possibility  that  has  kept  local  agents  of  negotiation  alert,  as  it  has  had
considerable impact in the neighbouring area of Tudun Wada. The main source of such
supply is wealthy men at the city level. Similarly, gifts for political patronage have been
received  all  the  way  from  the  national  level.  As  an  example,  in  the  1999  election
campaign, gifts of electrical equipment of use for mechanical bore holes were received
from a national politician. The possibility of supplies of such services caused local power
brokers to pay attention to the relevant networks outside their community. 
24 But the supply picture also includes external limitations on supply of water. Shortages
due to intermittent periods of drought have lead to swings in ground water supplies.
These have also affected the neighbouring industry, which has tended to make demands
on the water of the residential community which is located further down the same main
municipal pipe, thus aggravating the shortage there. It has led to the need for negotiation
on behalf of the whole community, again with active mediation of the ward heads, but
also of other representatives of the civil society that relate to these. Industrial pollution
of  the  water  from the  natural  stream running  through the  community,  has  further
affected some of the neighbouring household wells. This is another concern where the
community needs to negotiate as a unit with the industry. 
25 We understand this supply structure as being the result of what we may speak of as a
process  of  de-scaling  of  supply  ‘by  default’,andas  a  by-product  of  the  process  of
privatisation which can in this case also be characterised as having occurred by default
(following the  breakdown of the infrastructure). Supply is de-scaled largely through the
logics of location tied to the informalisation of services, and by dependence on small-
scale suppliers. This mode of privatisation supplements the more programmatic policy
proclaimed from the national level as a condition for World Bank loans that were offered
at this time for the overhaul of the public utility and the piped supply of the more central
areas of the city. Though proclaimed, they were implemented only in the form of one
small pilot purification plant to serve the industry. What remains of the central municipal
utility  continues  to  supply  central  high-income  residential,  commercial  and  public
administration areas. 
26 Let us then move to looking at  the regulation structures.  In the social  life of  Tudun
Murtala  issues  of  water  supply constantly  require mediation and regulation between
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different interests. When most of the water consumed at the household level could be
drawn from the supplies  administrated by the Kano Water  Board through the piped
system, this administering authority was the target of negotiation regarding claims for
better supplies. Claims could (in theory) be channelled through the parliamentary system
through the locally elected local government councillors representing the wards. They
were probably  just  as  often carried forth by direct  approaches  to  the supplier  from
lobbying coalitions of local representatives, as we shall see below. 
27 The changing agency structure of supply has led to adjusted patterns of negotiation and
brokerage  where  the  pattern  of  location  plays  a  part.  The  rows  in  Table  1,  above,
indicating the dimension of modes of regulation, enable us to summarize the complexity
of the spatial dimension of the combined supply and regulation structure. It helps us to
see how large sections of community level supplies have come to be controlled by the
informal market regulators, traditional authorities and by households, who to a large
extent lead their lives outside the formal economy.  
28 Apart from privatisation of small-scale supplies, by design and by default, the other main
process in the provisioning game in the recent times of liberalisation is the separation of
regulation from supplies. Even when the supply function gets devolved to levels nearer to
the users, this leaves a measure of regulating functions still in the hands of the state, but
largely devolved to lower scale levels. Public regulation and management have in this
process been largely devolved to the local government level in the form of certain control
functions. Licensing of the new and rapidly expanding commercial and privately owned
deep  ’mechanical’  wells  is  thus  done  by  the  local  government,  and  is  followed  by
intermittent inspections of water quality by the same agent. In addition there are said to
be  occasional  checks  of  the  common  household  wells,  particularly  when  there  are
outbreaks of cholera, as in 2001. Public regulation by the local government ends there,
however. 
29 The essence of this development is that with the de-scaling of supplies, other regulating
functions have taken hold of  the community level  supplies,  which implies that these
have,  to the same extent,  escaped from the reach of the local  government.  Here the
situation in Kano has its own characteristics. The colonial heritage of indirect rule that
existed there up to Independence in 1960 has resulted in a division of labour with neo-
traditional authorities still  in control of basic livelihood conditions at the community
level, particularly in low income areas. As reported by Gboyega (1998), a series of reforms
for the dismantling of indirect rule have since sought to limit the formal powers of the
neo-traditional office bearers to the mediation of ’peace and harmony’ in the spheres of
community – household relations. Some very basic functions have, however, remained in
the hands of the neo-traditional ward heads. In Tudun Murtala, for instance, they still
took care of the registration of land transfers according to officials at the Kano state
planning  authority,  KASEPPA  (interview  2002).  The  recent  process  of  small-scale
development and informalisation of service provision in the case of water has the result
of pushing this balance of regulation even further in favour of neo-traditional authorities
at the community level. This becomes visible when we look at the ways local users and
citizens articulate their demands for access and influence over access to water, and to
whom their demands are directed. 
30 My study of the patterns of demand-making over issues of access to water in Tudun
Murtala shows that it is when it comes to conflicts between community based commercial
providers, such as formal deep-well managers and informal vendors, on the one hand,
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and the water-using residents of the community, on the other, that the capacity and the
legitimacy  of  neo-traditional  authorities  to  handle  the  regulation  of  these  conflicts
become visible.9 The ward heads play a part  in mediating between agents of  supply,
internal and external to the community, and their authority is difficult to circumvent for
community residents.10
31 Their methods of regulation and the modes of demand making that they engender lead
me to link the process of decentralisation of supplies to the area of local politics, and at
least  tentatively  suggest  that  it  works  against  the  process  of  democratisation.  We
therefore  proceed  to  look  at  the  various  actors  involved  in  concrete  situations  of
negotiation, starting with the modes of demand making applied by users and others who
seek to influence supplies as citizens residing in the community.
32 When individuals want to change their access to water within the new supply system,
they use a range of strategies. They may step up individual supplies by digging deeper
household  wells  or  walking  further  to  fetch  water  from  the  few  remaining  natural
streams. Most strategies are, however, directed at influencing other agents of supply or
regulation. I found cases where violence had been used, as when in the late 1990s one
bore-hole owner was killed in an armed robbery commonly attributed to his profiting
from water  shortages at  a  time of  drought.  Another event  that  I  documented was a
conflict when consumers threatened to smash the equipment of the water vendors, when
these had raised the price of water following the closing of a crucial tap connected to the
public  pipes  running  through the  community.  When the  vendors  organised  a  strike
lasting several days, it was the leading ward head of the community that could muster the
authority and legitimacy to step in as the mediator. In that instance, he arbitrated in
favour of the vendors, with the acquiescence of the community, as further violence was
prevented. 
33 Users of water also form groups for collective action. The formation and activities of the
self-help  groups  referred  to  above  is  one  example  that  involves  participatory
management at the initiative of,  and with support from, the local  government.  More
pertinent  as  a  regulating agent  was Tudun Murtala  Development Association (TUDA)
which was at this time the most established town organisation. Originally formed by some
young educated residents  for  the  purpose  of  external  lobbying,  TUDA also  works  in
support of community development and ‘peace and harmony’ internally. 
34 Intervention in support of  formal democratic procedures was also made by the local
chapter of the Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP). This was a branch of a
national NGO with an agenda to mobilise members in the local community to challenge
the agency of local government in the field of water. The main activity was to educate
citizens to use the parliamentary process to its full potential. During 2000, the general
focus of their city-wide campaign was on water, and in particular industrial pollution of
water. Their mode of operation was public mobilisation and voters’ education in the local
elections, inducing people to take up water pollution as an election issue. Later, they
organised meetings of groups of citizens, including those from Tudun Murtala, with local
government officials, who were repeatedly interrogated concerning implementation of
election promises between elections.11
35 But,  more spontaneous interest  group organising was rare,  of  limited success,  unless
played out in coalition with the neo-traditional rulers or with TUDA, which operated very
close  to  the rulers.  This  was  illustrated by the case  of  one experienced trade union
organiser,  a  long-time  resident  in  the  community,  and  his  frustrated  attempts  at
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gathering his neighbouring households in an independent protest. The issue of concern
was the negative impact that newly drilled deep mechanical bore-holes in central parts of
Tudun Murtala had on the water level in the local house wells. In his own interpretation
of  events,  it  was  the  fact  that  he  did  not  ally  with  the  neo-traditional  community
authorities that inhibited his neighbours from joining his campaign.12 Nevertheless, we
did find the same man, also as the local organiser and trainer for this community, behind
the  explicit  efforts  of  the  above-mentioned  CAPP  to  widen  the  arena  for  secular
organisation.  Together,  his efforts  show  us  the  seed  for  a  more  secular  form  for
organisation  as  part  of  a  local  politics  of  provision  independent  of  neo-traditional
authorities.13
36 Notable for its absence is the influence of women as a group, and as individuals. For the
majority  of  housewives  in  seclusion,  the  main  managers  of  household-water,  the
development of the new water ‘regime’ that we have described here has meant a reversal
to  a  neo-traditional  dependence  on  their  husbands  for  their  access.  Their  previous
control over supplies from public taps, that they exercised by sending younger girls to
queue up to collect water, has been replaced by complete dependence on their husbands’
duty to supply them from whatever source they choose. Usually this was done through
sending water vendors to their door with their vans. The regulation of the conflicts in
household  relations  that  may  then  ensue  is  another  area  where  neo-traditional
authorities have considerable influence. But, the housewives also enter the supplier trade
in the capacity of  vending cart  owners.  Non-Muslim female southerners may and do
participate as entrepreneurs of distribution. And, even among those in seclusion, I met
women who raised income from renting out water vending carts. The money earned was
said to be used for instalments in the mutual saving societies, to which many women
belong.  
37 The parliamentary system offers vehicles for channelling grievances, by voting for and by
approaching  the  Councillors  for  the  wards,  who were elected  through a  multi-party
process. As representatives of the community, their field of influence also includes the
regulation  of  appropriation  and  pollution  of  the  available  water  by  the  competing
industry,  as  well  as  matters  of  licensing and quality inspection handled by the local
government, through the Council.  
38 Also at the extra-community level the use of lobbying was at least as important as a mode
of influencing provision and has typically involved delegations to the Water Board, to
competing industries and to philanthropists.  These delegations were found to include
coalitions of representatives of the town association (TUDA), the self-help groups, and
importantly and unavoidably a representative of the neo-traditional ward heads. A local
government councillor, would sometimes also be included, particularly as, at this time,
his origin was in the other groups (self-help and TUDA), which had recently formed the
recruitment base for this function. This form for channelling grievances made the non-
parliamentary  forms  for  influence,  including  those  of  the  neo-traditional  rulers,
important also in relations outside the community.
39 We thus find that in the case of water provision in Tudun Murtala at the time of this field
study, the neo-traditional ward head had a hand in very many of the modes of interest
promotion and demand making taking place. Internally, in Tudun Murtala, we find him
not only as a social advisor to individuals, but also as a mediator in conflicts between
groups of citizens, e.g. in the case of the conflict of users vs. water vendors. Although
elected (for life) by the residents, his inherited neo-traditional role as a keeper of ‘peace
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and harmony’ gave him particular authority in such situations. In external relations we
rather find him as a co-ordinating lobbyist in coalitions of TUDA, self-help groups and
even the local government council. He played this role in parties negotiating better terms
with the industries as they competed for access to their water, and with the Water Board
on the closure and mismanagement of communal water taps on the piped grid. We were
also told of his role in alliance with neo-traditional district authorities in approaching
philanthropists at the city level and negotiating shares in their ritual gifts of water. We
can thus single him out as a very important regulator of relations with suppliers at spatial
levels internal and external to the community. 
40 However, he was not the only regulator. In the case of the self-help groups we have seen
that their interventions are rather on the initiative of the local government. Negotiating
with the community, their representatives, however, have to relate to the ward heads as
brokers. The local government councillors have, of course, their own power base in the
secular  parliamentary  system.  But,  there  is  considerable  scope  for  neo-traditional
authority  meddling  into  the  operation  of  this  system  through  election  rigging  and
lobbying for candidates, as was openly acknowledged by my ward head respondent. With
decreasing municipal water supplies and with interventions from the local government
being limited to the licensing of boreholes (said in 2007 to be increasingly evaded by
drillers),  and to highly intermittent  health inspections, the regulating powers  of  the
parliamentary representative were also becoming more and more marginal. Thus we do
find co-operating and competing agents of regulation representing different social forces,
and have to conclude that the local neo-traditional rulers are without doubt important
holders of power. Indeed, the few attempts that have been made to organise outside of
them, have been largely abortive, as in the case of the mobilisation of resistance to a deep
bore hole by the resident unionist. 
41 It is of interest to note (see Table 1) that the different scale-levels that are targeted have
their  distinct  profiles  with  regard  to  agents  and  methods  of  demand-making  and
regulation. It seems that it is the role as conflict mediator between users and suppliers
inside the community, which gives the neo-traditional ruler the particular powers that
merit his inclusion as the formal head of the lobbying coalitions for external negotiations.
We may add that these powers may have been enhanced by his role in mediating between
interests of people in different parts of his ward. In an earlier phase, those residents in
different locations in relation to the decreasing number of functioning taps on the grid
represented such interest groups between which he was said to mediate. We can thus find
matters of spatial contradiction also internal to the community. 
42 The position of the neo-traditional authorities is further enhanced by their straddling
different political realms. Above the ward-head in the traditional hierarchy is the district
head, who has an office in the local government headquarters and who is appointed by
the Emir of Kano. Access of the ward-head to these power holders will also facilitate his
access to the Muslim philanthropists. 
 
A Hybrid Governance Pattern and its Democratic Content 
43 It thus appears that in the context of Tudun Murtala, we can count three main forms of
regulation combined in a hybrid mode of governance. The secular state (at various levels),
the leaders of community organisations and the neo-traditional rulers are the regulators
that combine to form one side of the community governance system. The legitimacy of
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each is based on the resident citizens who relate to them by more or less democratic
means. Each regulator has their particular legitimacy base in the users and other citizens
who are prepared to ally with them. These persons make up the other side of the mode of
governance around water in this community.
44 The particular mode by which they each relate to users and other local residents can be
scrutinized with regard to the democratic content of the relationship. Representation
through the state and the electoral system is shown to be weak. Water issues are given
very  low  attention  in  the  election  of  ward  councillors.  Their  influence  on  water
provisioning issues in local  government is  also weak,  and these issues are not  given
strong attention by them. Their representation of popular interests is also marred by the
fact that elections of ward councillors are highly manipulated by neo-traditional rulers. 
45 The channelling of demands and opinions via civil society organisations is a mode for
popular influence that is not well anchored in local traditions. Secular, non-traditional,
forms for community action, as when initiated by a man with union experience and
affiliation to a ‘secular’  NGO, was not met with great response. It was suggested that
popular support was given only to organisations that were sanctioned by neo-traditional
rulers and which involved commitment to supporting their modes of regulation. This
does not open for the practice of ‘substantial’ forms of democracy to any extent. The role
of  such  forms  in  deepening  the  democratic  deficit  thus  does  not  appear  to  be  of
immediate  importance  in  this  place  context,  with  its  particular  historical  and
institutional set-up. 
46 Neo-traditional  rulers  are  elected  for  life  and  have  strong  allegiance  to  the  parallel
authority system of the Emir. They are allowed to exercise power by paternalistic means
and  are  approached  through  clientilistic  relations  by  individuals  or  collectives  that
submit to their authority. There is complete lack of transparency and accountability in
their regulation of internal conflict. They are known to manipulate the electoral system
of representation through illicit influence on nomination and voting. They have powers
to lobby external regulators through direct contacts, individually as in contacts with the
industry,  and  in  combination  with  the  other  regulators.  They  do  not  encourage
independent popular organisation around internal community interests, particularly not
outside their own spheres of regulation. They certainly do not support the independent
agency of women in provisioning relations outside the home. 
47 We may thus conclude that the degree of popular influence around water provisioning in
Tudun Murtala cannot,  on the basis of  this material,  be characterized as particularly
democratic,  neither  by standards of  electoral  parliamentary democracy nor of  direct
‘substantial’ democracy. One may even perceive of this mode of governance as a virtual
reversal of the vision of democratisation of local governance of service provision that is
commonly the aim of the policy discourse on the benefits of decentralised provision. But
then  this  decentralisation  is  not  really  an  intended  one,  but  rather  the  location
consequence of the process of liberalisation by default.
 
Conclusions
48 The Kano case shows us a process of de-scaling of water provision to the community level
without corresponding adjustments in modes of state regulation. In this case this leaves
citizens  with  very  weak  ‘secular’  democratic  means  of  influence  over  access  and
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conditions of access. In a situation where civil organizing is not developed, it is difficult to
identify much immediate scope for ‘substantial’ democratic alternatives. Meanwhile, it is
clear that  the actual  powers of  influence of  poor residents within the parliamentary
regulation system are not very large either. 
49 As a place, Kano is special in the continued strength of the neo-traditional regulation
sphere, based on a still  viable Emir-centred authority structure, and its heritage as a
centre for Islamic culture in a range of respects. It is also true that it is located in one of
the Nigerian states (provinces) that have in the past decade (in 1999) introduced the
shari’a criminal  laws.  The generally  interesting circumstance is,  however,  the way in
which these  conditions  have historically  interacted in  very  particular  ways  with the
locally and regionally specific forms of capitalist development that we see in this city (see
e.g.,  Lubeck  1995  and Watts  1996).  Probing  the  specific  features  of  community  level
governance  that  this  has  yielded  has  served  our  main  purpose,  to  demonstrate  the
relevance  of  considering  the  scale  specific  nature  of  the  conditions  of  political
organisation that influences popular access to livelihood resources when liberalisation
has taken the form it has in this case. If we compare with conditions in cities in other
parts of Africa or, even only in Southern Nigeria, where the neo-traditional powers have a
different history of articulation with modern economic development, we are certain to
find  very  distinct  specificities  in  the  ways  they  manifest  themselves  in  provisioning
politics at the community level. These are specificities that add to the characteristics of
climate, hydrology, demography, economy and political culture in their historical and
geographical contexts which explain the patterns that we find. The scope for comparative
studies aiming for further generalisations is great in this field.
50 Of course, the empirical study reported here could be expanded to confirm and deepen
what we have seen so far. Some immediate questions concern first the actual relations
between traditional rulers and residents which might also be differentiated in several
categories. By what means do residents negotiate with the authority of regulation and
influence ? Who gains and who loses in the paternalistic system of contestation between
them and informally and traditionally regulating agents ? In the short run,  the close
knowledge  of  conditions  of  poor  residents  held  by  the  local  neo-traditional  power
holders, together with their greater legitimacy as mediators between many locally based
agents, may make them well equipped to represent their interests outside the community
and to intervene internally in this conflict-prone and commonly riot-exposed context. We
must concede that our tools might need to be refined in order to catch this ‘substantial’
dimension of representation as well. Experiences from the neighbouring country of Niger,
in the related Hausa society, where traditional authority is still formally recognized (and
from where notably many water vendors in Tudun Murtala are said to be recruited),
would be of interest to bring in for comparison.  Further documentation might tie on to
recent interesting research on the agents of regulation that develop in the ‘twilight’ zone
between  weak  state  institutions  and  other  local  authorities  in  places  with  differing
conditions, as documented in the studies referred to above and reported in Lund (2006). 
51 Conditions for forming collective organisations of shorter and longer duration, and the
nature of their relations to neo-traditional authorities, are further themes for research.
Points of departure originating from this study would include the close allegiance we
noted of  the town association (TUDA) to the neo-traditional  authority,  while modern
secular organisations, such as CAPP and its related activists, have legitimacy problems.
The historically low propensity for collective organisation may well  be on its way to
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change. This may well happen under the influence of external NGOs, which sometimes
have international funding connections as a basis for influence, as was the case with
CAPP.  It  might  be  fruitful  to  look  deeper  into  the  occurrence  of  organisations  in
associated fields of service provision and material livelihood concerns. I saw in Tudun
Murtala  a  number  of  community  based  organisations  concerned  with  prevention  of
erosion along the central drainage canal running through the community. It is likely that
their collective experience of organisation might have a spread effect. Connection with
Islamic networks and their development is another phenomenon one might like to probe
further. 
52 While stressing the goals of satisfying human rights principles with respect to access to
water, and recognizing the continued need for contestation among popular users and
agents of influence over access, there is need to ask how the system can be made more
respectful of popular interests in access and influence through a more democratic mode
of provision. Responsibilities for furthering such goals will in some sense be spread over
the social forces that participate in the game of water provisioning, both those on the
regulating and on the demand-making sides. It would seem that public institutions at the
city level, while of course circumscribed by national and provincial agents, are however
in  particular  positions  to  act  based  on the  comparative  strength  of  their  regulation
powers. 
53 Focusing on the public agents of regulation, our analysis in this case leads us to formulate
a number of alternative policy options. They could strengthen the reach and presence of
‘secular’ democratic institutions of regulation at the community level, if this is where
supply and regulation actually  take place.  They could further  support  forces  of  civil
society organisation,  to realize not  only participatory management,  but  also political
influence as part  of  the modes of  provision.  Finally,  they could pay attention to the
democratic problems associated with the remaining and possibly expanding powers of
neo-traditional forces of regulation. 
54 A challenging question to pursue is what difference a more decentralised state regulation
structure, built on closer public presence at the community level,  could make in this
particular case. We certainly have no reason to romanticise the democratic qualities of
the secular parliamentary system and its modes of regulating service and infrastructure
provision in Nigerian cities.  Still,  after decades of oppressive military rule in Nigeria,
elections  to  the  local  governments  have  been  somehow  revitalised,  returning
representatives from communities at the urban ward level to the secular parliamentary
system of representation. Although these elections usually do not concern the concrete
livelihood issues, that e.g., CAPP has tried to mobilise around and train citizens for, at
least  they  do,  with  all  their  flaws  and  shortcomings,  provide  channels  for  popular
demand-making on matters of urgent popular interest.  
55 In a different approach, one option is of course to return to the basic matter of the modes
of liberalisation or commercialisation practised at the city level. The possibility might
still be there to reverse the fragmented and informalised modes of provision and
seriously  consider  the  scope for  overhauling the  central,  city  level  utilities  of  water
processing  and  distribution.  In  case  these  utilities  were  state  controlled,  if  not  by
ownership at least by effective regulation, and the task of supplying the whole city area
with processed water  were taken seriously,  the potential  to  facilitate  equalisation of
access including the peripheral low income areas might still be there. Just as much in
favour of  this alternative may be the argument of the powerful economies of scale that
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are usually associated with provision through central purification plants and city wide
pipe-systems of distribution. In a city like Kano, where comparatively abundant sources
of water are available in the Kano River combined with conditions of a sensitive ground-
water table, the option of expansion of supplies by deep bore-holes may compare very
negatively with expansion by dependence on central intakes from Kano River. But, of
course, in the final analysis it all boils down to the conditions set by the political economy
of the particular place, as inserted in the national and global context. 
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NOTES
1. This programme has received generous funding from the Swedish International Development
Cooperation Agency (Sida) which is hereby acknowledged.
2. The form ‘provision’ is used in the general sense of the word while ‘provisioning’ is meant to
emphasize a connotation of agency. 
3. Regarding the earlier institutional context of water supplies for Kano see also WUP (n.d./late
1990s).
4. Documented on CD in Decentralisation in Practice: Power, Livelihoods and Cultural Meaning in West
Africa,  International  Workshop  Highlights,  Uppsala,  Sweden,  May  4-6,  2004,  International
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), London & Dept. of Cultural Anthropology and
Ethnology, Uppsala University, Uppsala (brochure + CD-ROM).
5. For the concept of governance applied in a service provisioning context in the global South see
Devas (2004).
6. We may refer to all of them as ‘users’ for short.
7. Interviews Sabo Munkaila (2000 and 2002).
8. For a fuller account, see Andrae 2005.
9. Again, see Andrae 2005 for greater detail.
10. In analyzing this I refer to the time immediately after the replacement of a single ward with
four different ones for this community. I perceived the old single office bearers to continue to be
rather hegemonic in acting as representatives of the whole community.
11. Interview Yunuza Yau 2002, one time National President of CAPP. More detailed information
on CAPP and its role in water provisioning is given in Andrae (2007).
12. But in 2007 we did hear of another, more successful neighbourhood protest on similar issues,
where we do not, however, have information of the conditions of struggle.
13. Interview in 2002 with Ibrahim Yusuf, the one-time chairman of the local chapter of CAPP. 
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RÉSUMÉS
The case of water provisioning in Tudun Murtala, a peripheral low income area in Kano, Nigeria,
is used to highlight an expanding form of decentralisation in infrastructure provision in African
cities and the democratic problems associated with it. I look at the decentralisation ‘by default’
that  is  connected  with  the  type  of  liberalisation  that  takes  the  form  of  informalisation  of
supplies. The concurrent separation of supply from state regulation means that the regulation of
relations between suppliers and users escapes from public control at the municipal and local
government level into traditional hands at the community level. For users, this entails a revived
dependence  on  neo-traditional  politics,  rather  than  the  development  of  the  parliamentary
system, as a mode of influencing the conditions of access to water provisioning.
Le cas de l’approvisionnement en eau de Tudun Murtala,  une zone périphérique modeste de
Kano,  Nigeria,  est  utilisé  pour  analyser  une  forme  émergente  de  décentralisation  de
l’approvisionnement en eau des villes africaines et les problèmes démocratiques associés à celle-
ci. J’étudie la décentralisation « par défaut » qui est liée au type de libéralisation favorisant une
informalisation de l’offre.  La séparation de l’offre et  du règlement de l’État,  implique que la
régulation des rapports entre fournisseurs et utilisateurs échappe au contrôle public communal
et local pour aboutir au contrôle des institutions traditionnelles. Pour les utilisateurs, cet état des
choses  implique  une  dépendance  ravivée  de  la  politique  néo-traditionnelle  plutôt  que  le
développement d’un système parlementaire, comme mode d’influence des conditions d’accès à
l’eau.
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